CFP: Journal of Virtual Worlds Research: Law and Virtual Worlds

CFP Journal of Virtual Worlds Issue on Law and Virtual Worlds 

A Special Issue edited by:

Melissa de Zwart, Adelaide Law School, Australia

Greg Lastowka, Rutgers School of Law-Camden, USA

Dan Hunter, New York Law School. USA

The University of Western Australia (UWA) presence on Second Life

The Journal of Virtual Worlds Research (http://www.jvwresearch.org/) is an online, open access academic journal that engages a wide spectrum of scholarship and welcomes contributions from the many disciplines and approaches that intersect virtual worlds research. The field of virtual worlds research is a continuously evolving area of study that spans across many disciplines and the JVWR editorial team looks forward to engaging a wide range of creative and scholarly work.

Motivation and Scope

This special issue will focus on legal questions generated by the creation, regulation and participation in virtual worlds. We are looking for papers that explore beyond the basics of ‘the magic circle’ (asserting that virtual worlds are immune from external laws and norms) and consider emerging legal issues that may encourage or inhibit the uptake of virtual worlds. In particular, we are interested in papers that adopt a multi-jurisdictional focus and which propose new ways that the legal issues may be approached by developers and regulators. Innovative and creative papers are encouraged.

Given the audience and nature of the JVWR we are looking for papers which are accessible to a non-legal readership. They should demonstrate a good awareness of the nature of virtual worlds.

Authors are invited to submit papers that are innovative, original, and contribute to the advancement of understanding of law as it applies to virtual worlds. Papers will be considered by the Guest Editorial Board and reviewed by expert referees using our double -open policy. Double-open policy means that in general, authors do not need to anonymize their papers, and reviewers identity is also known to authors. For more details about see JVWR site --> About JVWR --> For Authors --> Our double-Open Policy.

Possible topics include, but are not limited to:

• Jurisdiction and rule-making
• Governance and community management
• Player rights
• Virtual property
• Dispute resolution
• Intellectual property, modding, user-generated content
• Privacy, identity and data collection
• Security and hacking
• Crime
• Freedom of speech, freedom of expression, discrimination, access and hate speech

Submission Instructions

Authors are invited to submit papers of up to 6000 words (including footnotes and references) via the JVWR publishing system (see www.jvwreserach.org> about > for authors). Accepted papers will be published online in the Volume 6, Number 2 of the Journal, 2013. 

Deadlines and Timeline

Authors can submit a 600 word abstract as of the publication of the call.

Please use the Journal publishing system (login at the top right of the journal site, state that your submission is for the Legal issue.) 

Abstract submission will give authors quick feedback on the relevance and appropriateness of their topic and allow editors to identify reviewers as soon as possible. 

• Final deadline for Authors to submit abstracts for Editors’ comments: 30 June 2012
• Editors submit comments on the Abstracts to Authors: 30 Aug 2012
• Authors submit full paper: 30 Dec 2012
• Editors send Reviewers’ feedback on the paper, and indication of acceptance or rejection: 15 February 2013
• Submission of revised paper (if necessary): 30 April 2013
• Editors’ decision and comments for accepted papers: 20 May 2013
• Authors Submission of final version: 15 June 2013
• Staff editors & authors work till planned Publication Date: 15 July 2013

Further Information

CFP website JVWR

Please contact:

Melissa de Zwart, Adelaide Law School, melissadez AT gmail.com

Greg Lastowka, Rutgers School of Law-Camden, lastowka AT camden.rutgers.edu

Dan Hunter, New York Law School, USA

Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v National Rugby League Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 34

Proving yet again that copyright law in Australia is shaped by sport...

In July 2011, Optus began offering its subscribers access to the TV Now service, which (subject to payment of the relevant fee) allowed users to select to record TV programs being shown on free-to-air TV, provided  that the 'record' button was selected prior to the commencement of the relevant show. The AFL and NRL, together with Telstra, the exclusive licensee of broadcasts of the footage of AFL and NRL games via the internet and mobile phones (I am avoiding the terms devices here as this seems to be a point of contention in this instance) claimed that such recordings (and the necessary playback) were an infringement of copyright. The action was actually brought on the basis of  groundless threats of infringement under s 202 Copyright Act.

On 1 February 2012, Rares J in the Federal Court held that the TV Now service did not infringe copyright in the broadcasts of certain AFL and NRL games in 2011, Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v National Rugby League Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 34 .

The Optus subscriber using the TV Now service 'could select a program to record from an electronic program guide that would appear on any one of ...four kinds of device': a PC, Apple devices, Android devices or other 3G devices. Thus, once a program was selected to 'record' by a user, four individual copies would be made to support each of these platforms. Each individual user would also have a unique set of files made for their use ie multiple copies were made, each corresponding to an individual and unique request. These files were stored by Optus for 30 days, for playback by the user. who accessed the content via streaming. Users of Apple devices could view the content 'almost' live, ie subject to a two minute delay, due to differences in Apple file saving requirements. Each user has an allocated amount of recording time, depending on which 'plan' they had purchased. Users could only record TV shows shown in their 'home' region.

Optus relied upon s 111 Copyright Act, which (relevantly for our purposes) provides:

(1) This section applies if a person makes a cinematograph film or sound recording of a broadcast solely for private and domestic use by watching or listening to the material broadcast at a time more convenient than the time when the broadcast is made.

Note: Subsection 10(1) defines broadcast as a communication to the public delivered by a broadcasting service within the meaning of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 .

(2) The making of the film or recording does not infringe copyright in the broadcast or in any work or other subject-matter included in the broadcast.
Note: Even though the making of the film or recording does not infringe that copyright, that copyright may be infringed if a copy of the film or recording is made.

The parties agreed that the Court should answer the following questions before proceeding to consider any further matters:

1. Who did the acts involved in recording the broadcasts?
2. Did s 111 mean there was no infringement of copyright? If there was infringment of copyright, was Optus liable for authorisation of copyright infringement?
3. When the recording was viewed, who did the acts of electronically transmitting the copyright workks?
4. Is streaming a communication 'to the public'?
5. Was Optus responsible for 'making the works available' online?
6. Was this 'to the public'?

Rares J concluded that the user of the TV Now service (rather than Optus)  'makes each of the films in the four formats when he or she clicks on the "record" button on the TV Now electronic program guide. This is because the user is solely responsible for the creation of those films.' [para. 63] Optus did not do any of the acts involved in recording the works, see para 68:  drawing the comparison with the photocopier in UNSW library in the Moorhouse case: 'it was impossible to say that the University did the act of photocopying by providing the photocopier, just as, in my opinion, it is impossible to say that Optus makes any of the films in the four formats that are created when a user clicks "record" and its datacentre carries out that instruction.' Perhaps this analogy is a little overstated given that the technology required to undertake the recording was entirely operated by Optus. All the user had to do was press a button, with no regard as to how this command would be achieved. In addition, in order to offer the service at all a considerable investment had to be made in receiving, recording and hosting equipment.

At para 80-81 Rares J emphasises that all that is achieved by the service is the outcome of time shifting as contemplated by s 111. See, in particular, para 81:

'If a person can watch a broadcast “near live”, away from a television, that may enable him or her to do something else. For example, the person may want to finish a task at work in the time it would take to travel home, because he or she knows that, once he or she finishes the task, he or she can view the broadcast “near live” when travelling home late or while still at work. Such a purpose is consistent with the definition of “private and domestic use”. Moreover, the rightholders accepted that pausing the contemporaneous recording of a broadcast to allow a user to do something else, even momentarily, can entail that the recording is made for use immediately after the viewer finishes the distracting event because that is a time more convenient than the time when the broadcast is made.'

These paragraphs seem to gloss over the point that what is really being talked about here is format rather than time shifting, and this is in essence, what is at the heart of the Optus business model, to get a slice of the internet and mobile devices market, which is exclusively licensed, for a large sum, to Telstra.


In response to the other questions, Rares J concluded that the user did the act of electronically transmitting the film, despite the use of Optus's equipment and services [para 95], and the communication was made to the user only and not 'to the public' [para 100] . Rares J also had to deal with the conclusion in Telstra Corporation Ltd v APRA (1997 HC) (the music on hold case) that if a work is communicated in circumstances where the copyright owner can expect a fee, the communication is made "to the public" regardless of whether it is made to only one person at a time'. [para 101] Rares J correctly recognises that: The TV Now service is part of Optus’ service that it offers to the market in order to attract and retain customers. As the business case for Optus’ decision to invest in the TV Now service recognised, the service would give it the significant market benefit of a leading position in the digital television industry and “delivers the customer value proposition ‘record and watch my favourite TV shows on the go’”. [para. 102] However, Rares J concludes that the communication of the recording to the user's device 'lacks the element of commercial detriment to the rightsholders' that had been present in the Telstra case. Thus, it could not constutite a communication to the public.

Finally, the digital file of the recording was not an 'article' or 'article or thing' withing the meaning of s 103 or s111(3)(d).

The Apple streaming technology was held to give rise to different issues to be considered separately.

Bram believes that there is plenty of scope to argue that whilst s 111 enables users to record material for viewing 'at a time more convenient than the time when the broadcast is made', time is not the only, nor perhaps even the main, matter to be considered here. Section 111 did not contemplate format shifting, that is dealt with in other sections of the Act.

The case has been appealed to the Full Federal Court.

panGloss: Digital IP job at Strathclyde

panGloss: Digital IP job at Strathclyde: Following fast on the news about the PhD and Postdoc, here is stage 3 of the world domination plan.. Strathclyde is appointing 4-6 new jobs...

Copyright Symposium 2011

Bram has had an exciting and thought provoking day at the Copyright Symposium in Sydney, a treat for anyone who has a 'thing' about copyright!
First, we had an overview from Francis Gurry, Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organisation, on the key issues being thought about and dealt with in WIPO. He presented an optimistic view on the improving dialogue between content providers and technology developers, signalling a possibility of some progress on future copyright solutions in the digital environment. It is a slowly, slowly approach to copyright reform generally, hopefully building confidence that reform CAN be achieved. Dr Gurry expressed the view that we need a digital roadmap to set out the elements of how we may get to an effective digital marketplace.
William Patry, copyright guru and Senior Copyright Counsel at Google, followed up with an entertaining and engaging presentation. The 'take away' from his presentation was that it was likely we would see a one stop shop for the whole world, selling digital content (I wonder what shop that may be??) and that global copyright reform needs to respond to consumer expectations (and yes he conceded creators should be paid for their creations). He argued that law may not be the answer to all of a problems, but rather should be viewed, as appropriate, as a tool to solve them.
We then had a response from Brett Cottle, Chief Executive of APRA and staunch defender of copyright, who reinstated the law as leader of change, rather than merely a follower. Brett disputed whether responding to the demand for instant gratification was a good thing. Importantly, he suggested that some merit may be found in the commercial/ non-commercial distinction in terms of formulating exceptions for the digital environment (of this, more tomorrow).
Francis Gurry's view on this was that whilst consumer expectations were important, they should be tempered somewhat with realistic allowances for payment of creators.
All in all a great session, which I think has set the scene for the next two days.
Kim Weatherall and Michael Williams followed this up with a session on the question of whether copyright needs radical reform or whether its foundations are sound (yes just that small and easy to solve q). Kim was characteristically interesting, well informed and had great slides.
We then had sessions on Authorship (is there a crisis?), doing business online (which ended on a depressing note, but we all agreed we value Australian content) and Traditional Knowledge. Bram notes that a highlight was the recognition that interactive games are the real growth sector (oh hoorah!)
Interesting and valuable things are happening here on the copyright front, stay tuned!

New post on GIs

A little to the left of Bram's usual interests, here is a blog on a forthcoming chapter on Geographical Indications, in the context of Old World vs New World. The Adelaide Uni wine blog is here.

US Supreme Court on videogame violence

The decision in Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association was handed down on 27 June 2011. Bram offers a very brief overview of the judgment which presents a variety of approaches to the legitimacy of the California Statute restricting the sale or rental of violent video games to minors.
The majority held that the California Act which prohibited the sale or rental of 'violent video games' to minors and required such games to be labelled '18' was invalid as it violated the First Amendment.
The Act identifies a violent video game as one where: 'the range of options available to a player includ[e] killing, maiming, dimembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being.' The game will be subject to legal restriction under the Act if it meets the following three additional requirements:
“(i) A reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find [the game] appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors.
“(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors.
“(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.” §1746(d)(1)(A).

The opinion of the Court was deliverd by Scalia J. He confirmed that video games qualify for First Amendment protection. 'Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas- and even social messages- through many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player's interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer First Amendment protection.' Because the Act constituted a restriction on the content of protected speech, the Act would be invalid unless California could demonstrate that it was justified by a compelling government interest and was narrowly drawn to serve that interest. The Court held that it failed on both counts. Scalia J noted the fact that it applied only to violent video games, when there is much other violent content, including tehe Saturday morning cartoons which were not covered by the impugned Act, and that the industry had already implemented a voluntary rating system which would assist parents in identifying unsuitable games.
Alito J wrote a concurring judgment on the narrower basis that the statute was too broadly drawn. He did not consider that it was necessary to reach a broader decision that the statute violated the First Amendment. Alito J disagreed with the majority judgment on a number of grounds, notably the assertion that violent video games were no different from violence portrayed in other media. Alito J makes a number of criticisms of the majority judgment, notably; 'the Court is far too quick to dismiss the possibility that the experience of playing video games (and the effects on minors of playing violent video games) may be very different.
This theme is also picked up in the dissenting judgments of Thomas and Breyer JJ. Thomas J undertakes a review of attitudes to childhood and child raising at the time the Founding Fathers were drafting the Constitution. He concludes that the concept of 'freedom of speech' as understood at that time could not possibly have included a right to speak to children without going through their parents. Therefore he concludes that the California statute is not unconstitutional as it does no more than restrict sales and rentals direct to minors. Parents and guardians can provide such games to their children if they wished.
Breyer J's decision focusses on the potential harm to children from violent video games. He attaches a long list of studies to his judgment which indicate that such games may cause psychological harm. Thus he concludes that the California statute is justified as it imposes only a modest restriction on speech at most.
The entire judgment is worth a close read.

Facebook Contempt of Court derails UK drug case

Head on over to Fortnightly Review to read up on this recent UK case, where a juror contacted a defendant on Facebook.